Toward Online Robust Zero-Sum Markov Games with Function Approximation

arXiv:2610.26286 · cs.LG, cs.AI · Submitted 2026-10-19 · Read on arXiv

cs.LG, cs.AI

Submitted: 2026-10-19

Updated: 2026-10-19

Comments: Accepted at NeurIPS 2026. 70 pages, including appendices

License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

The gist: Online robust zero-sum Markov games pose a coupled operator-learning and game-solving problem: from nominal interaction data, the learner must recover a worst-case minimax Bellman operator while

Abstract

Online robust zero-sum Markov games pose a coupled operator-learning and game-solving problem: from nominal interaction data, the learner must recover a worst-case minimax Bellman operator while maintaining strategic coverage and controlling stage-game approximation error. Existing robust reinforcement-learning theory does not yet provide such an operator-learning perspective beyond specialized multi-agent settings. We develop an optimistic dual robust Bellman framework that combines dual robust Bellman fitting, optimistic minimax planning, backward-validated confidence sets, and exploiter-mix data collection. Our analysis is organized around the robust Bellman residuals induced by the candidate value class and yields a regret reduction that separates exploration complexity, robust operator-estimation error, stage-game solution error, and misspecification. Under explicit interpretable assumptions, we obtain conditional theorem interfaces for general and projected function approximation, together with closed results in several structured regimes, including tabular, epochwise cross-fit linear, self-normalized pure-online linear / finite-rank kernel, and projected RKHS truncation. Small-scale numerical experiments illustrate robustness calibration, strategic coverage, and the return-gap trade-off predicted by the framework.

Related papers