When Safety Fails Collectively: Robust Alignment Against Harmful Fine-Tuning via Joint Weight Perturbations

arXiv:2610.25683 · cs.AI · Submitted 2026-10-19 · Read on arXiv

cs.AI

Submitted: 2026-10-19

Updated: 2026-10-19

Comments: 15 pages, 3 figures

License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/

The gist: Harmful fine-tuning can rapidly erode the safety alignment of large language models, creating substantial risks when aligned models are adapted to downstream tasks.

Terminology

Abstract

Harmful fine-tuning can rapidly erode the safety alignment of large language models, creating substantial risks when aligned models are adapted to downstream tasks. Existing alignment-stage defenses use harmful examples and simulated harmful perturbations during safety alignment to prepare models for later harmful fine-tuning, yet the collective effects of harmful weight perturbations remain underexplored. We identify a collective failure pattern: disjoint parts of a harmful perturbation have limited effects in isolation, but their joint application increases the model's harmfulness beyond the sum of their individual effects. Guided by this observation, we propose Joint Weight Perturbations (JWP), an alignment-stage defense that masks different parts of a harmful perturbation estimated from the current model and trains the model to respond safely in the resulting states. This exposes the model to different combinations of harmful perturbations and reduces its sensitivity to their accumulation during subsequent harmful fine-tuning. Experiments across downstream tasks and model families show that JWP offers stronger resistance to harmful fine-tuning than prior defenses while largely preserving task performance.

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