Allocating Indivisible Goods to Strategic Agents: Pure Nash Equilibria and Fairness
cs.GT, cs.AI, cs.DM
Submitted: 2021-09-17
Updated: 2026-10-21
Comments: The claim that every pure Nash equilibrium of Round-Robin is EF1 (Theorem 3.3 here; Theorem 3 in the conference version and Theorem 4 in the journal version) is incorrect; the gap is in the proof of Lemma 3.5 (inequality (2)). A counterexample and corrected guarantees are given in arXiv:2610.23686. The remaining results are not affected
License: http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/
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