The Economic Security of Exponential EIP-1559

arXiv:2610.10333 · cs.GT, cs.CR, cs.DC · Submitted 2026-10-07 · Read on arXiv

cs.GT, cs.CR, cs.DC

Submitted: 2026-10-07

Updated: 2026-10-07

Project page: https://abdouecon.github.io/research/papers/feepolicies.pdf

Terminology

• Calibration — 2× in this paper · explained in 7 episodes
• Generalization — 1× in this paper · explained in 13 episodes

Sources

• Transaction Fee Mechanism Design for the Ethereum Blockchain: An Economic Analysis of EIP-1559

Related papers

• Exact Regret Frontiers and Externality Scheduling in Centralized Serial-Dictatorship Bandits
• In-Context Credit Assignment via the Core
• Breaking 1/epsilon Barrier in Quantum Zero-Sum Games: Generalizing Metric Subregularity for Spectraplexes
• Enhancing Affine Maximizer Auctions with Correlation-Aware Payment
• LLM Bidders Preserve the Mechanism-Level Orderings of Human Bidders
• Towards Performatively Stable Equilibria in Decision-Dependent Games for Arbitrary Data Distribution Maps