Beyond Incentive Compatibility: Rational Harm-Proof Transaction Fee Mechanisms

arXiv:2609.32005 · cs.GT, cs.CR · Submitted 2026-09-25 · Read on arXiv

cs.GT, cs.CR

Submitted: 2026-09-25

Updated: 2026-09-25

Terminology

• Robustness — 5× in this paper · explained in 5 episodes
• Economics and Computation — 3× in this paper
• Core — 2× in this paper · explained in 2 episodes
• Adaptation — 1× in this paper · explained in 1 episode
• Pruning — 1× in this paper · explained in 4 episodes

Sources

• Multidimensional Blockchain Fees are (Essentially) Optimal
• Towards a Functional Fee Market for Cryptocurrencies
• Incentive-Compatible Collusion-Resistance via Posted Prices
• Characterizing Off-Chain Influence Proof Transaction Fee Mechanisms
• Does Your Blockchain Need Multidimensional Transaction Fees?
• Uncertainty in Mechanism Design
• Nonbossy Mechanisms: Mechanism Design Robust to Secondary Goals
• Multiple Proposer Transaction Fee Mechanism Design: Robust Incentives Against Censorship and Bribery

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