Too Late to Slash: Coordinating a Risk-Free Equivocation Attack

arXiv:2609.30509 · cs.GT, cs.CR · Submitted 2026-09-24 · Read on arXiv

cs.GT, cs.CR

Submitted: 2026-09-24

Updated: 2026-09-24

Terminology

• Nash Equilibrium — 13× in this paper · explained in 2 episodes
• Accountability — 3× in this paper · explained in 2 episodes
• ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing — 1× in this paper
• Consistency — 1× in this paper · explained in 3 episodes
• Robustness — 1× in this paper · explained in 5 episodes
• Verification — 1× in this paper · explained in 2 episodes
• Verifier — 1× in this paper · explained in 2 episodes

Sources

• Casper the Friendly Finality Gadget
• STAKESURE: Proof of Stake Mechanisms with Strong Cryptoeconomic Safety

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