Credible AUctions via MPC Gadgets: Bounding Information Leakage Under Abort

arXiv:2609.27402 · cs.GT, cs.CR, econ.TH · Submitted 2026-09-23 · Read on arXiv

cs.GT, cs.CR, econ.TH

Submitted: 2026-09-23

Updated: 2026-09-23

Terminology

• Information Leakage — 12× in this paper · explained in 2 episodes
• Sequential Revelation Auction — 12× in this paper
• Winner Determination Gadget — 8× in this paper
• Deferred Revelation Auction — 4× in this paper
• Secure Multi-Party Computation — 4× in this paper
• Winner Determination Problem — 4× in this paper
• ACM Conference on Economics and Computation — 2× in this paper
• Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatible — 2× in this paper
• Adaptive Strategy — 1× in this paper · explained in 1 episode
• Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing — 1× in this paper
• Benchmark — 1× in this paper · explained in 2 episodes
• Information Asymmetry — 1× in this paper · explained in 2 episodes
• Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference — 1× in this paper
• Robustness — 1× in this paper · explained in 5 episodes
• Verifiability — 1× in this paper · explained in 2 episodes
• Verification — 1× in this paper · explained in 2 episodes

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