Optimally Selecting Representative Agents from a Metric Space
cs.GT, cs.LG
Submitted: 2026-08-29
Updated: 2026-08-29
License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
The gist: This paper studies the problem of proportionally fair clustering, where the goal is to select k ``centers'' from a metric space that fairly represent a set of agents who also lie in the metric space.
Terminology
Abstract
This paper studies the problem of proportionally fair clustering, where the goal is to select k ``centers'' from a metric space that fairly represent a set of agents who also lie in the metric space. Specifically, we focus on finding a clustering satisfying a fairness property known as the Droop core. In the practical special case in which the set of feasible center locations contains every agent location, the previous best-known result guaranteed a (1 + sqrt 2) -approximation of the Droop core, while the best-known lower bound was 2. In this paper, we show that this lower bound is tight and that a clustering in the 2-Droop core always exists. Further, we show that such a clustering can be achieved by only selecting centers from locations in the metric space where an agent resides. We establish this using Scarf's theorem guaranteeing a nonempty core for balanced non-transferable utility games. This result has several interesting corollaries. Most notably, it resolves the β-plurality problem of Aronov et al. [2021] for general metric spaces. The main result of this paper was generated by - - through a series of interactions with the authors. The authors of this paper verified the generated proof and rewrote it for clarity.
Related papers
- Exact Regret Frontiers and Externality Scheduling in Centralized Serial-Dictatorship Bandits
- In-Context Credit Assignment via the Core
- Breaking 1/epsilon Barrier in Quantum Zero-Sum Games: Generalizing Metric Subregularity for Spectraplexes
- Enhancing Affine Maximizer Auctions with Correlation-Aware Payment
- LLM Bidders Preserve the Mechanism-Level Orderings of Human Bidders
- Towards Performatively Stable Equilibria in Decision-Dependent Games for Arbitrary Data Distribution Maps