The Framing Gap: Indirect Prompt-Injection Exfiltration Defeats Surface-Level Defenses in Tool-Using Agents
cs.CR
Submitted: 2026-08-27
Updated: 2026-08-27
Terminology
Sources
- Defeating Prompt Injections by Design
- RTBAS: Defending LLM Agents Against Prompt Injection and Privacy Leakage
- Adaptive Attacks Break Defenses Against Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks on LLM Agents
- The Attacker Moves Second: Stronger Adaptive Attacks Bypass Defenses Against Llm Jailbreaks and Prompt Injections
- Your Agent's Memories Are Not Its Own: Forged Reasoning Attacks on LLM Agent Memory and Defenses
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