Collusion with Competitive Marginals: Price-Level Audits Are Blind by Construction
Xin Xu, Chengrui Wu, Jiayu Lu, Kaizhen Tan, Siru Tao, Hanzhe Hong
cs.GT, cs.AI, cs.CR
Submitted: 2026-07-29
Comments: 11 pages, 4 figures, includes technical appendix
License: http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/
Terminology
Sources
- Algorithmic Collusion by Large Language Models
- On the Fragility of AI Agent Collusion
- Strategic Collusion of LLM Agents: Market Division in Multi-Commodity Competitions
- The Oracle's Fingerprint: Correlated AI Forecasting Errors and the Limits of Bias Transmission
- Time to Bribe: Measuring Block Construction Market
- Order Flow Exclusivity and Value Extraction Mechanisms: An Analysis of Ethereum Builder Centralization
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