Near-Tight Theoretical Bounds for Incentive Compatibility in Bitcoin Mining

arXiv:2607.24415 · cs.CR, cs.GT · Submitted 2026-07-27 · Read on arXiv

Akira Sakurai, Taishi Nakai, Kazuyuki Shudo

cs.CR, cs.GT

Submitted: 2026-07-27

License: http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/

Terminology

• Core — 122× in this paper · explained in 2 episodes
• Action Space — 6× in this paper · explained in 1 episode
• Nash Equilibrium — 4× in this paper · explained in 2 episodes
• Accuracy — 2× in this paper · explained in 1 episode
• Consistency — 2× in this paper · explained in 3 episodes
• Reward Function — 2× in this paper · explained in 2 episodes

Sources

• On the Incentive Compatibility of Block Propagation in Bitcoin

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