Mission-Level Runtime Assurance for LLM-Assisted ISR Swarms over a Verification-Aware Fabric
Nikolaos Kekatos, Panagiotis Katsaros, Alexios Lekidis, Theodoros Nestoridis, Tom Nianios
cs.CR, cs.AI, cs.LO, cs.RO
Submitted: 2026-07-26
License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
The gist: Swarms of LLM-assisted autonomous robots are increasingly proposed for cooperative intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) in contested environments.
Terminology
Abstract
Swarms of LLM-assisted autonomous robots are increasingly proposed for cooperative intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) in contested environments. A growing class of their assurance failures arises not within any single platform but across the swarm: individually-compliant actions compose into a mission-level violation: a prohibited objective split across platforms to evade per-platform lim- its, or a collective budget quietly exceeded. Per-platform guardrails miss these by construction, and contested communications let the violation hide behind lost or delayed evidence. We present a three-tier (platfor- m/squad/mission) compositional runtime-verification framework that de- composes a mission policy into per-agent and cross-agent aspects, aggre- gates per-platform verdicts over a verification-aware messaging fabric, and fuses them with an evidence-aware, two-axis (security x complete- ness) algebra whose provenance names the platforms that jointly trig- gered a violation. Because the fabric makes evidence loss and silence observable, unsupported negative verdicts are downgraded to an explicit unknown rather than reported as mission-wide all-clears. On a simulated ISR mission, an indirect prompt injection that causes real LLM planners to split a prohibited collection task across four platforms is invisible to every per-platform monitor yet detected compositionally with full prove- nance; under an injected fault campaign a best-effort central monitor emits silent false all-clears while the verification-aware fabric emits none
Sources
- Prompt Infection: LLM-to-LLM Prompt Injection within Multi-Agent Systems
- STAC: When Innocent Tools Form Dangerous Chains for LLM Agents
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