Time Is Money: Incentivized Causal Transaction Ordering
Hongyin Chen, Xu Zheng, Jichen Li, Ittay Eyal
cs.CR, cs.DC
Submitted: 2026-07-13
Code: https://github.com/XRPLF/rippled
License: http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/
Terminology
Sources
- Timing Games: Probabilistic backrunning and spam
- Blockspace Under Pressure: An Analysis of Spam MEV on High-Throughput Blockchains
- F3B: A Low-Overhead Blockchain Architecture with Per-Transaction Front-Running Protection
- Front-running Attack in Sharded Blockchains and Fair Cross-shard Consensus
- Condorcet Attack Against Fair Transaction Ordering
- FairDAG: Consensus Fairness over Multi-Proposer Causal Design
- Travelers: A scalable fair ordering BFT system
- Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) Protection on a DAG
- PROF: Protected Order Flow in a Profit-Seeking World
- Mempool Privacy: An Economic Perspective
- Mechanism Design for Automated Market Makers
- Eating sandwiches: Modular and lightweight elimination of transaction reordering attacks
- The Monotone Priority System: Foundations of Contract-Specific Sequencing
Related papers
- SoK: AI-Augmented Binary Reversing
- Relaxed Sender Anonymity for CBDC Interbank Settlement: A Zero-Knowledge Approach on Permissioned EVM
- Calibration-Family Overfit: Why Trusted Sabotage Monitors Don't Transfer Across Lineages
- Efficient Fuzzy PSI under One-Sided Assumptions
- Sealing the Audit-Runtime Gap for LLM Skills
- Token Composition: A Graph Based on EVM Logs