Performance Manipulation: Labor Market Implications in AI-assisted Era

arXiv:2604.22230 · econ.GN, cs.GT, cs.LG, q-fin.EC · Submitted 2026-04-24 · Read on arXiv

econ.GN, cs.GT, cs.LG, q-fin.EC

Submitted: 2026-04-24

Updated: 2026-08-29

Code: https://github.com/moogician/trustworthy-env

License: http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/

Terminology

• Benchmark — 35× in this paper · explained in 2 episodes
• Accuracy — 16× in this paper · explained in 1 episode
• Adaptation — 12× in this paper · explained in 1 episode
• Nash Equilibrium — 7× in this paper · explained in 2 episodes
• Feature Engineering — 6× in this paper · explained in 3 episodes
• Generalization — 5× in this paper · explained in 13 episodes
• AI Agents — 3× in this paper · explained in 2 episodes
• Generalizability — 3× in this paper · explained in 6 episodes
• Generative AI — 2× in this paper · explained in 2 episodes
• AUC — 1× in this paper · explained in 2 episodes
• Aggregation — 1× in this paper · explained in 1 episode
• Benchmarking — 1× in this paper · explained in 3 episodes
• Consistency — 1× in this paper · explained in 3 episodes
• Data Augmentation — 1× in this paper · explained in 7 episodes
• Feature Extraction — 1× in this paper · explained in 2 episodes
• Generative Modeling — 1× in this paper · explained in 3 episodes
• In-Context Learning — 1× in this paper · explained in 4 episodes
• Latent Representation — 1× in this paper · explained in 2 episodes
• Latent Representations — 1× in this paper · explained in 3 episodes
• Loss Function — 1× in this paper · explained in 2 episodes
• Modularity — 1× in this paper · explained in 9 episodes
• Regret — 1× in this paper · explained in 3 episodes
• Regularization — 1× in this paper · explained in 3 episodes
• Reward Hacking — 1× in this paper · explained in 8 episodes

Sources

• Scoring Strategic Agents
• Manipulation-Proof Machine Learning
• MLE-bench: Evaluating Machine Learning Agents on Machine Learning Engineering
• Benchmarking Reward Hack Detection in Code Environments via Contrastive Analysis
• Mechanism Design under Costly Signaling: the Value of Non-Coordination

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