Plan-Driven Adaptive Bidding for First-Price Auctions with Budget Constraints under Nonstationarity
cs.GT, cs.LG
Submitted: 2025-05-05
Updated: 2026-09-20
License: http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/
Terminology
Sources
- No-regret Learning in Repeated First-Price Auctions with Budget Constraints
- Learning to Bid in Contextual First Price Auctions
- Contextual Standard Auctions with Budgets: Revenue Equivalence and Efficiency Guarantees
- Non-Stationary Reinforcement Learning: The Blessing of (More) Optimism
- Learning to Bid Optimally and Efficiently in Adversarial First-price Auctions
- Algorithmic Collusion And The Minimum Price Markov Game
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